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INTRODUCTION
Deviant consumer behavior (DCB)– that which is against the 
law, a regulation, or violates the generally accepted norms of con-
duct (Fullerton and Punj 1993; Moschis and Cox 1989) – is an ongo-
ing problem in marketplaces around the globe. Deviant consumers 
can cause financial, physical, or emotional harm to an organization, 
employees, and other consumers. While there is a growing body of 
research exploring what constitutes DCB, research investigating why 
consumers engage in DCB is sparse (Daunt and Harris 2012). This 
lack of understanding is reflected in the “one size fits all” approach 
to deterrence strategies that focus on emphasizing the need to uphold 
the law and/or the penalty that would apply. 
This paper answers the research question how does the size of 
harm caused and the size of the victim influence perceptions of DCB? 
In this paper, the focus is on harm to the organization. We designed 
two studies to further our understanding of the complexities of DCB, 
to inform the development of more effective deterrence strategies. 
Study 1 explored how the size of harm and victim informed consum-
er perceptions of DCB and the neutralization techniques individuals 
use to rationalize DCB. Study 2 measured and examined differences 
in perceptions of DCB where the size of the harm and the size of 
the victim were manipulated. These two factors – size of harm and 
size of victim – have been identified as potentially significant factors 
influencing the perceived acceptability of consumer actions (Neale 
and Fullerton 2010).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizations largely rely on traditional deterrence strategies 
whereby all consumers are treated the same, and receive the same 
deterrence message. Deterrence theory is grounded in the classical 
school of criminology and the “rational choice view of human be-
havior” (Pratt et al. 2006, 367). It assumes that individuals weigh up 
the costs and benefits of a situation, and then make rational decisions 
based on increasing their pleasure (e.g. benefits) and decreasing their 
pain or harm (e.g. risk/costs) (Pratt et al. 2006). The effectiveness of 
this approach to understanding human behavior has been criticized, 
with suggestions that there are underlying psychological factors 
that influence human behavior beyond the rational approach (Ak-
ers 1990; Garoupa, 2003; Mazar, Amir and Ariely 2008; Mazar and 
Ariely 2006). Acknowledging the differences in perceptions of DCB 
means organizations will need to consider more tailored approaches 
to deterrence strategies. Perceived size of harm and size of the victim 
are two dimensions commonly suggested as conceptual dimensions 
that individuals use to distinguish between right and wrong behav-
iors (e.g. Fullerton and Punj 2004; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Jones 1991; 
Muncy and Vitell 1992; Vitell 2003). The recommendations made in 
this paper are the need to develop strategies tailored to deter behav-
iors based on the perceived size of harm caused, and the size of the 
victim.
Size of harm refers to how much harm the consumer perceives 
their DCB will cause to the organization involved. In a review of 
over 30 consumer ethics studies spanning from 1990 to 2003, Vitell 
(2003) suggested that individuals’ ethical judgements were informed 
by the degree of harm involved in the behavior, alongside how pas-
sive or active the consumer was in the act, and whether the behavior 
was perceived as legal. These three conceptual dimensions largely 
reflect those originally suggested in Muncy and Vitell’s (1992) Con-
sumer Ethics Scale. Only one study known to the authors has tested 
the role of these conceptual dimensions in DCB. Mitchell and Chan 
(2002) found that severity of consequence (harm caused) played a 
role in the enactment of DCB. The greater the perceived size of harm, 
the less likely the individual would engage in DCB (Mitchell and 
Chan 2002). Similar conceptualisations of the size of harm dimen-
sion have been found in a number of other frameworks including Ful-
lerton and Punj’s (2004) typology of DCB, which suggests behaviors 
could be perceived as distinct based on the type and degree of disrup-
tion caused. Moreover, Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) General Theory of 
Marketing Ethics, proposes the ethicality of a behavior reflects the 
perceived consequences of each behavior alternative and the (un)de-
sirability of the consequence incurred by those involved. These two 
dimensions from Hunt and Vitell (1986) suggest the behavior with 
the greatest degree of harm to the greatest number of people would 
be the most unethical. In Jones’ (1991) moral intensity framework 
of ethical decision making, the magnitude of consequences also pro-
vides support for the ‘size of harm’ dimension in that the more harm 
the behavior causes, the more deviant the behavior is perceived to be.
Size of victim refers to who the victim is of the DCB. In the 
scope of this paper, the victim considered is a small organization or 
a large organization. Social distance theory posits that the greater 
the perceived social distance between the organization and the con-
sumer, the greater the likelihood of DCB occurring (Houston and 
Gassenheimer 1987). The greater the organization’s size, the greater 
the perceptions of impersonality, and thus the greater the probability 
of DCB because the consumer does not feel they are harming the 
organization (Fullerton and Punj 2004). DCB towards a large organi-
zation can be perceived as a ‘faceless crime’ (Cox, Cox and Moschis 
1990). If the DCB is directed towards a more identifiable victim, 
the victim has a greater ability to engender empathy from the indi-
vidual committing the deviant act, reducing the instances of deviance 
(Jenni and Loewenstein 1997). Drawing on Jones’ (1991) concentra-
tion of effect dimension of the moral intensity framework, a small 
organization could be perceived as a more identifiable victim than a 
large organization, because the concentration of effect of DCB on a 
small organization is greater than it would be on a large organization. 
Based on the conceptual dimensions identified in the literature, the 
following hypotheses are made:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the size of harm, the more unaccept-
able the DCB will be perceived.
Hypothesis 2: The smaller the size of the victim, the more unac-
ceptable the DCB will be perceived.
METHOD
Two empirical studies were conducted to examine the role of 
the perceived size of harm and size of victim in consumer percep-
tions of varying types of DCB. Study 1 involved 29 semi-structured 
in-depth interviews with a card sort activity. The topics covered dur-
ing the interview were; defining acceptable, questionable, and unac-
ceptable behavior, exploring contradictions between categorisation 
of a behavior in the card sort activity and consumer perceptions of 
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right and wrong, and neutralization techniques employed to justi-
fy questionable and unacceptable behaviors. The sample included 
males and females over 18 years of age, living in Australia, who 
were recruited using a non-probability sampling technique of con-
venience and snowballing. Interviews were conducted until theoreti-
cal saturation was reached (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The interview 
transcripts were analyzed in Nvivo 9.2 via thematic analysis (Braun 
and Clarke 2006). Study 2 comprised of 815 participants recruited 
through an online panel in the United States. The sample contained 
a 50:50 gender split, and respondents offered their perceptions of the 
acceptability of DCB using third person scenarios and rating them 
on a six point Likert scale (1 = unacceptable, 6 = acceptable). Re-
spondents did not require experience committing the DCBs given 
they were asked only to rate the acceptability of the actions of a third 
party acquaintance. The data were analyzed via four two-way ANO-
VAs comparing differences in the effect of size of harm and size of 
victim on the four DCBs examined. 
STUDY 1 RESULTS
Evidence of the size of harm and size of victim constructs were 
identified in the qualitative data. 
Size Of Harm
Size of harm referred to how much harm the consumer per-
ceived the behavior would cause to the victim (large or small organi-
zation). The greater the perceived harm, the more likely the respon-
dent would perceive the behavior as unacceptable. When discussing 
a range of behaviors, respondents reflect on various degrees of harm 
and how that influences how they distinguish between right and 
wrong behaviors:
If somebody [the waitress] has miscalculated [the bill] by a few 
dollars, you might not worry about it. If it was a substantial 
amount, say if the other bill was $100 and they charged $50, 
okay then, you probably would worry about it. (#6)
Yeah well, you know, [drinking a soda in the grocery store and 
not paying for it] a can of soda it’s about three bucks so you de-
prive the supermarket of three dollars and it’s not that big of a 
deal. Depending on the [public transport] fare, it could be two 
or three dollars as well, so that’s not that big of a theft… Then 
you’ve got this dress or a power tool, and I don’t know about 
power tools or dresses but from my understanding dresses are 
at least a hundred dollars and power tools same [that’s unac-
ceptable]. (#3)
Size of harm was associated with Sykes and Matza’s (1957) 
neutralization technique of ‘denial of injury’, which argues that no 
one is being hurt by the consumer’s actions:
Trying to get in to see the Mona Lisa and the Louvre or some-
thing like that if I can save a couple of bucks by claiming that 
she’s a little bit younger [than she really is] then it wasn’t going 
to be any skin off anybody’s nose particularly with thousands of 
people there a day. (#11)
Respondents had arbitrary definitions for what constituted 
‘enough harm’ to classify a behavior as unacceptable. The variability 
in what respondents perceived as an acceptable level of harm reflects 
their varying points of individual tolerance for DCB:
If you’re going to a movie, um and that’s only a $5 thing…but 
then if you’re going to lie to save like $200 to go to a theme 
park, then it’s like maybe…I shouldn’t even be considering that 
activity, I should just be doing something else, rather than try-
ing to lie to do it. (#10)
It would depend on how much we’re talking about. If we’re talk-
ing about, the value of a main course meal at $25 bucks, and 
I’ve realised, in an appropriate time frame, when we can eas-
ily point that out [the miscalculation]… I probably wouldn’t be 
rushing back in to point out that we were supposed to pay them 
another $2.50. (#7)
The arbitrary definitions for what constituted ‘enough harm’ 
means organizations need to develop strategies that persuade con-
sumers that $5 harm is just as unacceptable as $100 harm. 
Size Of Victim
In the scope of this paper, DCB can be directed towards a small 
or large organization. When exploring insurance fraud and fraudu-
lent returns, respondents reflect on the distinction between the two 
types of organizational victims: 
I’d be really tempted to kind of, “yeah, just do it [commit insur-
ance fraud].” Insurance company, they take too much money 
anyway…this is a chance to get something back from the money 
that you’ve paid… it’s not that big of a deal…if it was like a 
small family based, not a multinational, high profit company 
then I’d probably go, “oh I don’t think it’s right, you know, 
the insurance company’s owned by this family and, you know, 
they really need the money to be competitive...I don’t think you 
should do that.” (#24)
[Lying about why you’re returning an item] I guess if it was 
somewhere like X or Y [two large national chain department 
stores]…it’s not really going to hurt them as opposed to obvi-
ously returning it to like a boutique store…I mean these small 
businesses are trying to make a profit like they don’t, it’s not like 
a big company where they can afford to maybe, oh, someone’s 
doing that, okay well let’s hope it doesn’t happen again, let’s not 
lose out that much but it’s obviously a much more smaller busi-
ness would notice that as opposed to a larger business. (#13)
The quotes above highlight consumer willingness to victimise 
large rather than small organizations, on the basis that large organi-
zations can financially tolerate DCB better than small organizations. 
In other words, the concentration of the effect of DCB on a small or-
ganization is higher than on a large organization. Another respondent 
expresses a similar sentiment:
Using stolen credit cards to order goods over the internet…if 
it’s a small business, they can’t necessarily afford it, and the 
credit card companies don’t necessarily reimburse those busi-
nesses for the losses…I’ve had direct experience with them in 
the past where we sold stuff to someone in the US and it turned 
out to be a stolen credit card and Visa never refunded the money 
to the company, they said that’s just a business risk that you take 
on. (#18)
Using another perspective, a respondent reflects that DCBs di-
rected towards a large organization is more acceptable than directing 
harm at a small organization because the victim is less identifiable:
If you break something or use something at a supermarket with-
out telling someone, changing price tags, evading fares on pub-
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lic transport, these are all things that hurt a larger entity so it’s 
not as personal. (#5)
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralization technique ‘denial of 
victim’ was evident under the size of victim theme: 
Well look at the size of the store, look what they’re charging, 
look at the profits, excessive profits they’re making, possibly 
like X and Y [two large grocery chain stores] are doing it in a 
way that’s unacceptable as a duopoly so people will convince 
themselves that it’s acceptable to hit back. (#1)
The ‘denial of victim’ argument above is suggesting that the 
large organization’s behavior is unacceptable, thus the organization 
deserves the harm caused by the DCB. The absence of dissonance 
associated with performing a DCB makes it easier for the consumer 
to perform the behavior and maintain a positive self-image. 
To quantify the effects of size of harm and victim on perceptions 
of DCB, Study 2 was conducted.
STUDY 2 RESULTS
Study 2 asked respondents to rate the acceptability of four 
DCBs: returning used goods for a refund, lying about age in order 
to get a lower price, not saying anything when you buy a mispriced 
item, and insurance fraud. In the scenarios presented to the respon-
dent, the size of the victim organization was large (national chain) or 
small (corner store/independent), and the size of the harm was also 
large or small in dollar amounts. A summary of the empirical results 
(2x2 ANOVA and means) is found in table 1.
Table 1 . Summary of empirical results
ANOVA (significance)
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Behavior Harm Victim Mean Mean Mean Mean
Fraudulent returns ns ns 2.17 2.08 2.01 1.97
Lying about age .001 ns 2 2.28 2.13 2.36
Buying mispriced item .000 .001 3.4 2.67 3.7 2.03
Insurance fraud .000 ns 1.39 2.7 2.57 1.33
N=815 N=205 N=203 N=205 N=202
Consumer perceptions of fraudulent returns were not signifi-
cantly influenced by size of harm or size of victim. Consumer per-
ceptions of lying about age to get a lower price was influenced by 
the size of harm, F (1, 815) = 11.535, p = .001. The size of harm 
also influenced consumer perceptions of insurance fraud, F (1, 815) 
=332.056, p = .00. Finally, consumer perceptions of buying a mis-
priced item was influenced by both the size of harm, F (1, 815) = 
45.747, p = .000, and by the size of the victim, F (1, 815) = 10.417, 
p = .001.
Manipulating the size of the harm and victim also reveals that 
given certain circumstances (small victim, large harm), blatantly il-
legal actions such as insurance fraud (2.70) was rated as slightly but 
not significantly more acceptable than the miscalculated bill (2.67) 
which is an unintentional and unplanned windfall. The data partially 
supports H1 and H2.
Analyzing the means reveals some interesting and contrasting 
results. When the victim was small, increasing the harm was per-
ceived as less acceptable for fraudulent returns and buying a mis-
priced item, but more acceptable for lying about age and insurance 
fraud. When the victim was large, increasing the harm was perceived 
as less acceptable for fraudulent returns, buying a mispriced item, 
and insurance fraud, but more acceptable for lying about age. The 
variability in the outcomes suggests complexity in how underlying 
psychological factors and situational factors influence perceptions 
of DCB.
DISCUSSION
The findings of both studies illustrate that the perceived size of 
harm and size of victim can influence a consumer’s perceptions of 
DCB. These dimensions can also be used as justifications to enable 
DCB to occur, through the ‘denial of injury’ and ‘denial of victim’ 
neutralization techniques. To effectively deter DCB, strategies need 
to challenge these neutralization techniques. Specifically, marketers 
should consider the need to humanise their organization. Human-
izing the organization seeks to reduce the social distance between 
the consumer committing the deviant act and the organization being 
harmed, thereby reducing DCB (Cox et al. 1990; Jenni and Loew-
enstein 1997). Putting a ‘face’ to an organization makes it more dif-
ficult for the consumer to justify performing DCB at the expense of 
the organization because it leverages the identifiable victim effect. 
Identifiable victims engender a greater empathic response, making 
an individual more willing to engage in behavior that will reduce the 
harm inflicted on the victim (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997; Kogut 
and Ritov 2005). DCB is reduced when the individual performing 
the behavior can see the harm they are causing a specified victim 
(Small and Loewenstein 2003). Humanizing the organization may 
be a difficult strategy for very large, profitable organizations as the 
perceived social distance between the consumer and the organization 
is quite large. 
To attempt to overcome this issue for large organizations, the 
humanizing recommendation would need to be used in conjunction 
with another deterrence recommendation such as highlighting the 
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negative consequences caused by the consumer’s behavior. Consum-
ers who are more likely to engage in DCB are focused on the benefit 
they gain from performing the behavior, as opposed to acknowledg-
ing the negative outcome incurred by others as a result of their ac-
tions (Schlenker and Forsyth 1977). Therefore, there is a need for 
organizations to increase awareness of the outcomes DCB causes 
to the victim. Implementing information campaigns that go along-
side the humanization strategy could more clearly highlight the harm 
caused by the consumer committing the DCB. 
A future research opportunity would be to develop and test in-
terventions that reflect these recommendations to examine their ef-
fectiveness in reducing DCB. Taking a more tailored approach to 
deterrence strategies would overcome the limitations of deterrence 
theory. Humanization may also be an issue of salience as organiza-
tions increasingly implement self-serve technologies to interact with 
customers in order to reduce costs and attract new customers.  Future 
researchers should explore consumer perceptions of organizational 
technology use from an ethical perspective.
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